Progress Studies generally pre-supposes that industrial, scientific, and economic development are good things.
Consider this: What’s development? What subset of industrial, scientific, and economic labor count as development (versus business as usual)? Surely not everything—many things are dead-ends. Many developments, even ones that were temporarily widely used, turned out not to be worth the risk (see: thalidomide). Other developments are deemed, by some, not worth the risk, and well worth it by others (see: nuclear energy). On yet more, the jury is still out on whether the risk will have been worth it (like plastic). What makes any one thing a development? Progress Studies will at least need to agree on what is and is not development—if it can’t, how does it know what’s worth studying?
Now, say we managed to come up with some criteria for what counts as “progress.” Perhaps it’s some mix of the technology’s diffusion, or its ability to ‘unlock’ certain other technologies, discounted against its externalities. Now, if we had those criteria, we’d have to justify them: why are these the important things? To answer those questions, I reckon we’d find ourselves right back at the questions I asked in my original post.
If this is all philosophy: fine. But can Progress Studies really work independently of these questions? I understand if they get offloaded to philosophers. (I’ll do it; I’m a willing volunteer). But can Progress Studies afford to be agnostic about them? I’m trying to nudge at those points where philosophy may be subtly required to do the thing Progress Studies needs to do. Points where ideas about what progress is haven’t been questioned as finely as they might be, and where some additional question-asking in those areas may substantially strengthen Progress Studies’ analytical purchase—deciding what is Progress and why, then understanding what features allowed that progress to happen.
Thanks for your reply! I appreciate the thought.
Consider this: What’s development? What subset of industrial, scientific, and economic labor count as development (versus business as usual)? Surely not everything—many things are dead-ends. Many developments, even ones that were temporarily widely used, turned out not to be worth the risk (see: thalidomide). Other developments are deemed, by some, not worth the risk, and well worth it by others (see: nuclear energy). On yet more, the jury is still out on whether the risk will have been worth it (like plastic). What makes any one thing a development? Progress Studies will at least need to agree on what is and is not development—if it can’t, how does it know what’s worth studying?
Now, say we managed to come up with some criteria for what counts as “progress.” Perhaps it’s some mix of the technology’s diffusion, or its ability to ‘unlock’ certain other technologies, discounted against its externalities. Now, if we had those criteria, we’d have to justify them: why are these the important things? To answer those questions, I reckon we’d find ourselves right back at the questions I asked in my original post.
If this is all philosophy: fine. But can Progress Studies really work independently of these questions? I understand if they get offloaded to philosophers. (I’ll do it; I’m a willing volunteer). But can Progress Studies afford to be agnostic about them? I’m trying to nudge at those points where philosophy may be subtly required to do the thing Progress Studies needs to do. Points where ideas about what progress is haven’t been questioned as finely as they might be, and where some additional question-asking in those areas may substantially strengthen Progress Studies’ analytical purchase—deciding what is Progress and why, then understanding what features allowed that progress to happen.