For some this might be too fine a distinction, but for me understanding ontology has always been important, and I find compatabilism useful for its pragmatic distinction between ontology and any prescriptivist philosophy (like positivism). A compatibilist can accept that we don’t have free will and yet endorse the instrumental value of rhetoric that promotes freedom — what does it matter that under the hood it’s just thermodynamics? One can’t escape the illusion of free will even if and when you believe it is an illusion and try hard to do so. But pragamatism is a common thread running through compatabilist ontology and prescriptivism, and my aesthetic preference (? prejudice? precommitment) is to believing in things that work even when I don’t understand how or why.
So there might very well be a point in talking about progress even if we’re not sure whether or how it would have happened had we never existed.
For some this might be too fine a distinction, but for me understanding ontology has always been important, and I find compatabilism useful for its pragmatic distinction between ontology and any prescriptivist philosophy (like positivism). A compatibilist can accept that we don’t have free will and yet endorse the instrumental value of rhetoric that promotes freedom — what does it matter that under the hood it’s just thermodynamics? One can’t escape the illusion of free will even if and when you believe it is an illusion and try hard to do so. But pragamatism is a common thread running through compatabilist ontology and prescriptivism, and my aesthetic preference (? prejudice? precommitment) is to believing in things that work even when I don’t understand how or why.
So there might very well be a point in talking about progress even if we’re not sure whether or how it would have happened had we never existed.